Adapted from the Mediahacker.org
blog Not long after former President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide landed
in Haiti on Mar. 18, Kristoffer Rønneberg
at the Norwegian newspaper
Aftenposten posted online 13 new
private diplomatic cables from the
US government relating to Aristide
and Haiti from the Wikileaks Cablegate
set. Taken together, they portray
the United States as intractably,
almost obsessively, occupied with
marginalizing Aristide and the Lavalas,
and making sure other nations
fall into line. The French government
conspired with the US to
thwart Aristide’s return, discussing
how to “hinder” the return fl ight’s
logistics. The cables also show that
in 2008 current President René
Préval was trying to “co-opt” the
Fanmi Lavalas party into his ruling
coalition and was flatly opposed to
Aristide even being “in the hemisphere.”
Below is a round-up of key
passages from the cables. Four days before Aristide was
fl own out of the country in 2004,
the Dominican Ambassador to Haiti
said he was “worried” about chaos
in the North but thought that Aristide
was “very clever.” Aristide did
not ask the Dominicans for any help
or the use of a helicopter.
In October 2004, a confidante
of the Bahamian Prime Minister said
the U.S. did not but should have
given “a call from senior USG offi -
cials, or the White House, advising
him ‘when the United States decided
to change direction on Aristide’
and ‘remove him from power.’” In November 2004, nine
months after the coup, Dominican
President Lionel Fernandez gave
a speech in front of other regional
leaders in which he said Aristide
commanded “great popular support”
within Haiti and called for his
inclusion in the country’s democratic
future. The U.S. government was
shocked and outraged, commenting:
“The Aristide comment appeared to
come out of nowhere. Fernandez
had not previously discussed Aristide
by name in conversations with
us, or with our French and Canadian
counterparts… Perhaps the
greatest surprise for us was the palace’s
presumption that there would
be no downside.” The cable continues: “On
Nov. 6, 2004, during a pull-aside
at a social event, the Ambassador
admonished Fernandez that his
reference to Aristide was a serious
mistake, one that had the potential
of further inflaming a situation
already dangerous for the Haitian
people and for the international
peacekeeping force. Fernandez replied
that given popular support
for Lavalas, it would have to be
part of the situation. The Ambassador
was direct: Aristide had led a
violent gang involved in narcotics
trafficking and had squandered any
credibility he formerly may have
had. ‘Nobody has given me any information
about that,’ Fernandez
replied. The Ambassador insisted
that no supporter of human rights
and democracy could in good conscience
allow Aristide and his close
supporters back into the situation
in Haiti. Fernandez listened and
eventually agreed to distinguish
between Aristide and Lavalas. He
asked for any information on Aristide
that the United States might be
able to share with him.” Two months later, in January
2005, President Hugo Chavez of
Venezuela told the US Ambassador
there that “he believes the USG is
wrong on Haiti: There is no long
term solution that does not involve
Aristide in some way.” (The Venezuelan
ambassador was the only
foreign diplomat in the delegation
that received Aristide at the airport
on Mar. 18.) That same month, France and
the United States discussed how to
keep Aristide from returning home,
planning to warn Caribbean countries
and tell South Africa he must
not be allowed to return “under the
pretext” that it would hurt their
chance for a UN Security Council
seat: “Bienvenu later offered to express
our shared concerns in Pretoria,
perhaps under the pretext that
as a country desiring to secure a
seat on the UN Security Council,
South Africa could not afford to be
involved in any way with the destabilization
of another country...
Bienvenu speculated on exactly
how Aristide might return, seeing a
possible opportunity to hinder him
in the logistics of reaching Haiti. If
Aristide traveled commercially, Bienvenu
reasoned, he would likely
need to transit certain countries
in order to reach Haiti. Bienvenu
suggested a demarche to CARICOM
countries by the U.S. and EU to
warn them against facilitating any
travel or other plans Aristide might
have. . .Both Bienvenu and Barbier
confi ded that South African mercenaries
could be heading towards
Haiti, with Bienvenu revealing the
GOF had documented evidence that
10 South African citizens had come
to Paris and requested Dominican
visas between February and the
present.” In July 2005, a South African
official told the French that its government
“would not support any
effort by Aristide to return… Ntshinga
told the French that he would
share the French concern about
Aristide´s activities with the National
Intelligence Agency and ensure
that President Mbeki was also
informed.” A month later, the Jamaican
Labor Minister was chastised for
describing Aristide “as a friend in
need” after the coup. He said Washington
was overreacting. Jamaica
allowed him to pass through the
country on his way into exile, and
had offered the Aristides the option
to stay there for a few weeks “for
family reasons,” but on the condition
that Aristide “keep a low profile” and refrain from making public
statements. He stressed Jamaica
wasn’t taking an adversarial position
to the United States, but was
“reminded [by the Ambassador]
that the [Jamaican government]
acted unhelpfully” during the coup
and its aftermath. In the fall of 2008, as rumors
swirled that Aristide might leave
South Africa for Venezuela, Préval
met with the US Ambassador: “President
René Préval made reference to
these rumors, telling the Ambassador
that he did not want Aristide
‘anywhere in the hemisphere.’ Subsequent
to that, he remarked that
he is concerned that Aristide will
accept the Chavez offer but deflected
any discussion of whether Preval
himself was prepared to raise the
matter with Chavez.” The cables also contain indepth
commentary on Fanmi Lavalas,
Aristide’s party, with various
members (including Yves Cristallin,
a presidential candidate in the
Nov. 28 fi rst round who purported
to represent Lavalas) informing the
Embassy on what’s happening behind
the scenes. Meanwhile Préval,
the cable says, was trying to co-opt
the party into his political coalition.
I quote at length for close observers
of Haitian politics: “Despite his disagreements
with Aristide, Cristallin said he
feels compelled to keep his opposition
to Aristide´s return private due
to the considerable support for the
former President among many segments
of the population. [Text Removed
by Aftenposten] echoed
these sentiments in his October 1
meeting with Poloff, noting that
he shared Cristallin´s belief that the Executive Committee appointed by Aristide
was illegitimate Like Cristallin, he made an impassioned
plea for U.S. assistance so
that factions of the party willing to
renounce violent demonstrations and
forego illicit financing would prevail
against other factions of the party. “Embassy sources tell us that
President Préval is also actively working
to co-opt popular groups affiliated
with Lavalas to shore up his Support..
[Text Removed by Aftenposten]
told Poloff on September 19 that
Préval met ‘at least weekly’ with the
leaders of the “Reflection Cell,” including
Jean-Marie Samdy, at the National
Palace and that Préval had promised
the group HTG 58 million (approximately
USD 1.5 million) in funds from
the PetroCaribe account to distribute
to parents in poor neighborhoods for
the beginning of the school year in
early October. [Text Removed by Aftenposten]
provided a more plausible
account of the agreement, saying that
the Education Ministry had agreed to
task Lavalas-affiliated ‘popular organizations’
to identify needy families in
poor neighborhoods, and that the Ministry
would then pay their school fees
directly to the school concerned. “Although Aristide is nominally
the ‘National Representative’ of Fanmi
Lavalas, the party has essentially
been leaderless since Aristide left Haiti
in 2004, and any attempt to reassert
control over Lavalas would be fiercely
opposed (albeit privately) by one or
another group within the party. From
South Africa, Aristide has been either
unable or unwilling to resolve disputes
within his party or mobilize popular
support for Lavalas. “Factions in the party have
their reasons for opposing or supporting
a greater political role for Aristide
in Haiti and in the party. On one
side of the divide are elected offi cials
and former government offi cials who
want to unify feuding groups into a
disciplined party organization and
have the leadership elected by and accountable
to the party in Haiti rather
than to Aristide. These individuals resent
Aristide´s interventions in party
matters from afar, and are critical
of Aristide´s conduct during his two
terms in office. On the other side lie
leaders linked to popular organizations
who hope that Aristide´s greater
proximity will help them revive grassroots
militancy, which would then propel
them to positions of prominence.” The cables also reveal that the
Vatican agreed with the US Embassy
that Aristide shouldn’t return after the
earthquake and said it would communicate
that to him. The Dominican government
was concerned about the mass
migration of Haitians to the Dominican
Republic, and the Bahamas was not
optimistic about a peaceful resolution
of the 2004 crisis without outside intervention
in the days leading up to Aristide’s
ouster, the cables show. |